We study ingroup bias -the preferential treatment of members of one's group -in naturally occurring data, where economically signi…cant allocation decisions are made under a strong non-discriminatory norm. Data come from Israeli small claims courts during 2000-04, where the assignment of a case to an Arab or Jewish judge is essentially random. We …nd robust evidence for judicial ingroup bias. Furthermore, this bias increases with terrorism intensity in the vicinity of the court in the year preceding the ruling. The results are consistent with theory and lab evidence according to which salience of group membership enhances social identi…cation. JEL classi…cation codes: D03, D71, J15, K4, Z13
Introduction
Traditional economic models assume that people care only about their self interest. However, people may also care about groups to which they belong. We refer to this phenomenon as social identi…cation. One of the most extensively studied manifestations of social identi…ca-tion is ingroup bias: the preferential treatment of members of one's own group. A crucial observation here is that social identi…cation is endogenous: people do not automatically identify with any group they belong to. In particular, social identi…cation has been shown to be a¤ected by the salience of group-speci…c attributes.
Evidence for the existence of ingroup bias and for its sensitivity to group salience comes mostly from experiments. In this paper we study ingroup bias and saliency e¤ects in naturally occurring data, where professional decision makers make economically signi…cant allocation decisions under a strong non-discriminatory norm. Speci…cally, we analyze judicial decisions in Israeli small claims courts during 2000-04. These courts handle civil cases between private litigants.
Several features make this setting ideal for investigating ingroup bias. First, when making a decision, a judge in these courts allocates resources between two individuals who may or may not belong to her social group. This feature resembles standard lab experiments which measure ingroup bias. However, unlike allocation decisions in lab experiments, the decisions we study are made by professional judges who are expected to apply the law blindly. Second, the Israeli setting allows us to study social identi…cation with naturally occurring, "real-life", groups: Arabs and Jews. Third, the assignment of cases to judges within a given court is essentially random. This facilitates credible estimation of the extent of ingroup bias. Finally, the period studied is characterized by intense ethnically-based terrorist attacks. Since these attacks are plausibly exogenous to the legal procedure, they allow us to study the e¤ects of ethnic salience on ingroup bias. 1 The main source of data used in our analysis is transcripts of decisions made by judges in the small claims courts. From these documents we extract information on the court, litigants, subject of the claim, timing of decision, and claim outcome. The ethnicity of judges and litigants is deduced from their names. Our dataset covers the universe of documents available for 2000-04 where a plainti¤ of one ethnicity faces a defendant of a di¤erent ethnicity. Our main analysis focuses on 1,748 judicial decisions, 31% of which were made by Arab judges and the rest by their Jewish colleagues.
We …nd robust evidence for the existence of judicial ingroup bias in this period. A claim is between 17% and 20% more likely to be accepted if assigned to a judge of the same ethnicity as the plainti¤. In monetary terms the estimated bias translates to over $200 per case. The above estimates represent a level of bias that is characteristic of the period as a whole. We next ask whether this bias is an exogenously given feature of inter-ethnic relations in Israel or if, alternatively, it varies with the salience of ethnic cleavages. In particular, we examine whether judicial ingroup bias is related to the intensity of Palestinian politically motivated fatal attacks inside Israel. Results suggest that judicial ingroup bias is positively and signi…cantly associated with terrorism intensity as measured by the number of fatalities per capita in the area surrounding the court in the year preceding the judicial decision. Furthermore, the data seem to indicate that terrorism a¤ects judges of both ethnicities, leading Arab judges to favor Arab plainti¤s and Jewish judges to favor Jewish plainti¤s.
We interpret these …ndings in terms of a general framework for modeling social identity developed in Shayo (2009) . This framework -outlined in Appendix A -attempts to capture both the behavioral e¤ects of social identi…cation and the endogenous determination of the groups people identify with. The basic structure of the model is as follows. A society may have many social groups -"Israeli", "Arab", "middle class" and so on -but in any given situation individuals "identify" with only some of these. Given their social identities, individuals choose courses of action, which determine the aggregate outcome. That outcome forms the social environment that in turn a¤ects the pattern of social identities. A Social Identity Equilibrium is a steady state where (i) each individual's behavior is optimal given her social identity; (ii) social identities are optimal given the social environment; and (iii) the social environment is determined by the behavior of the individuals. The present paper seeks to shed light on two of the major components of the model. First, the e¤ect of social identi…cation on behavior (where we focus on ingroup bias); and second, the e¤ect of the social environment on identi…cation patterns (where we focus on the e¤ect of the salience of group-speci…c attributes).
We note, however, that since this is not a controlled experiment, we cannot completely rule out two alternative interpretations of our …ndings. First, in our setting the person making the allocation decision (the judge) communicates with the individuals receiving the allocation (the litigants). It is thus possible that what underlies the results is not a preferential treatment of members of one's own group but rather better transmission of information between the judge and the litigant when they belong to the same ethnic group. A Jewish judge may simply better understand the arguments made by a Jewish litigant than those made by an Arab one. While we cannot dismiss this possibility, it seems implausible that terrorism intensity should a¤ect the di¤erence in the quality of communication between judge and litigants.
Second, the results might be driven by litigant behavior rather than by judge behavior. This is a central issue confronted by Price and Wolfers (forthcoming) in their analysis of racial bias in refereeing decisions in the NBA. However, in contrast to the NBA setting, where a player might conceivably behave more aggressively when assigned a refereeing team of the opposite race, in our setting the legally relevant actions take place before the legal procedure starts, and certainly before the parties involved know the identity of the judge that will rule in their case. 2 The paper relates to two major strands of the literature. The …rst is the literature on social identity and ingroup bias and the second is the literature on ethnic and racial bias in economic and legal settings. Ingroup bias has been studied extensively using the experimental setting known as the Minimal Group Paradigm. In these experiments an individual allocates some resource between two other individuals, where the only thing she knows about them is whether they belong to her group or not. Starting with Tajfel et al. (1971) , this literature has demonstrated that ingroup bias can emerge even in arti…cially created groups, and has examined various factors which facilitate its emergence. Another prominent line of research looks at how the salience of group membership a¤ects contributions to public goods (e.g. Bornstein 2003 , Eckel and Grossman 2005 , Orbell et al. 1988 . Other settings where ingroup bias has been studied are reported in Bernhard et al. (2006) , Chen and Li (2009), Fong and Luttmer (2009) and Klor and Shayo (2010) . See Shayo (2009) for a review of this literature.
Beyond the literature on social identity, our paper is closely associated with the extensive literature on discrimination. The economic literature identi…es two major types of discrimination: taste-based (Becker 1957) and statistical (Arrow 1973 and Phelps 1972) . Our paper is more closely related to the former, but rather than treating the taste for discrimination as exogenously given, we seek to study its determinants. Methodologically, the approach we take in identifying the e¤ect of terrorism on judicial bias is similar to that of earlier studies which examine the e¤ects on economic outcomes of shocks to tastes associated with political events. A recent example is Michaels and Zhi (forthcoming) who examine the e¤ect of a deterioration in relations between the USA and France in 2002-03 on trade between the two countries. In the Israeli context, Miaari et al. (2009) examine how the outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada (uprising) in September 2000 a¤ected labor market outcomes of Arabs relative to those of Jewish Israelis.
Finally, a large literature studies possible bias against Blacks and Hispanics in the American criminal justice system. 3 A major methodological obstacle in this context is the di¢ culty of ruling out potential correlation between race and ethnicity on the one hand and unobserved case characteristics on the other. Several innovative strategies have been used to tackle this problem. For example, Abrams et al. (2007) rely on the random assignment of cases to judges to examine the between-judge variation in incarceration rates of Blacks relative to Whites. They …nd large inter-judge disparity, suggesting that at least some judges di¤eren-tially treat defendants based on their race. Alesina and La Ferrara (2010) use discrepancies in decisions made in lower versus higher courts to provide evidence of bias against minority defendants in capital sentencing. Glaeser and Sacerdote (2003) examine data on vehicular homicides, where the identity of the victim is arguably random, and …nd that drivers who kill Blacks receive signi…cantly shorter sentences. Finally, McConnell (2010) analyzes judicial decisions in federal courts following 9/11 and …nds no change in sentencing outcomes for any ethnic group other than Hispanics. A novel feature of our identi…cation strategy is the combined use of random assignment of judges to cases with exogenous variation in the salience of ethnicity to study judicial bias.
We proceed as follows. The next section describes the historical and institutional setting in which our empirical investigation takes place. In section 3 we explain how the dataset was constructed and provide descriptive statistics. Section 4 estimates the overall level of judicial ingroup bias in the period under investigation while section 5 studies the e¤ect of terrorism on the extent of the bias. Section 6 concludes. In the …rst days of October 2000 there were mass demonstrations and clashes between Arab Israelis and the police which left twelve protestors dead. These "October Events"are widely considered a turning point in Arab-Jewish relations in Israel, contributing to a rise in ethnocentric views among both Arabs and Jews. 
Small claims courts
Small claims courts operate in many countries around the world, including Australia, Canada, England and the USA. These courts handle civil cases between private litigants. The amount of monetary judgments they can award is capped: in Israel during the period under investigation the cap was set at 17,800 New Israeli Shekels (NIS), roughly equal to $US 4,000.
The rules of civil procedure and of evidence in the Israeli small claims courts are relatively simple. The procedure starts when the plainti¤ …les a claim at the court, provides supporting documentation, and pays a small fee. Claims can only be submitted to the court where either: (1) the relevant transaction took place or was supposed to take place; and/or (2) the defendant lives or works. Immediately following the …ling of the claim, the defendant is noti…ed and is instructed to provide a defense statement within …fteen days. The defendant has the right to submit a counter-claim to which the original plainti¤ needs to respond within seven days.
Once a claim was …led -or, in some courts, after the defendant has responded -the case is assigned a trial date and a judge. Due to a backlog in the system, trials are scheduled several months in advance. Each case is assigned to the …rst available slot. This means that the assignment of judges to cases within a court is in principle orthogonal to characteristics of the case.
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The judge receives the case materials no earlier than a week before the trial. Importantly, the plainti¤ and the defendant represent themselves in the trial, i.e. the litigants appear without lawyers. During the trial, which typically lasts only a few minutes, the judge sees the litigants for the …rst time and hears their arguments. 6 The judge has to issue a ruling in the case within seven days of the trial. Litigants who wish to appeal a ruling need to …rst request approval from the relevant district court. Three features of these small claims courts make them especially appealing for analyzing ingroup bias. First, unlike courts which handle criminal cases, in small claims courts the judge decides on monetary transfers between two individuals. Our investigation is restricted to cases where litigants belong to two di¤erent ethnic groups. Since the judge belongs to one 4 It is important to note, however, that the participation of Israeli Arabs in acts of politically motivated violence (either in concert with Palestinians from the Occupied Territories or independently) has remained negligible in scale.
5 Judges cannot normally decline to rule in a case, unless they are personally acquainted with one of the litigants. In such cases they need to notify the court management of the circumstances. 6 Litigants have a right to ask for an interpretor to be present in the court if they are not pro…cient in Hebrew.
of these groups, this generates a situation resembling standard (Minimal Group) experiments measuring ingroup bias. However, there are three crucial di¤erences between our setting and typical experimental settings: (a) decision makers are professional and operate under a strong non-discriminatory norm (equality before the law); (b) monetary stakes are quite signi…cant -the average compensation requested by plainti¤s in our sample is roughly $1,460; and (c) the groups in our setting are natural, i.e. they are not formed by the researcher.
A second important feature of small claims courts is that judges receive the case materials at most a week before the trial, meet the litigants only once, and are forced to produce decisions within a week. This means that the proximate timing of the decision is known (as opposed to cases involving protracted procedures, where it is hard to tell at what stage of the trial the judicial decisions were actually made). Another possible implication of the need to make decisions quickly is that it can make judges more susceptible to stereotyping and bias (on implicit bias see e.g. Bertrand et al. 2005 and Jolls and Sunstein 2006) .
Finally, since the ability of litigants to appeal decisions is limited and since the decisions do not attract public attention -these are after all small claims -judges in these courts enjoy almost complete discretion.
Data
Our main source of data is online transcripts of judicial decisions (rulings). These documents …rst became available online in late 2000 in a handful of courts, and coverage widened over time. The documents record the names of the judge and each of the litigants and typically include several paragraphs which sketch the arguments made by the litigants and the ruling of the judge. We cover the universe of available decision documents until December 31, 2004 (N=26,444) . For each document, we code whether each of the litigants is a private citizen, a business or a government agency. If the litigant is private, we code his or her ethnicity (Arab or Jewish) using a procedure detailed in Appendix B. The accuracy of this procedure derives from the fact (apparent in data from the Israel Population Registry) that there is little overlap between Jewish and Arab names. Having coded litigants' ethnicities for all available documents, we keep only "mixed cases": those where at least one private plainti¤ and one private defendant are of di¤er-ent ethnicities (N=2,027). For these cases we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the documents.
8 Focusing on mixed cases allows us to examine the situations that are of prime 7 Note that the data only allows us to distinguish between Jews and Arabs, and not between subgroups (e.g. Moslem and non-Moslem Arabs).
8 Each document is coded independently by two di¤erent coders (law students at the Hebrew University). A third (senior) coder veri…es the coding and adjudicates cases where there is an incompatibility across interest and that resemble standard lab experiments which study ingroup bias.
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For the mixed cases, we extract data on the following:
Court.
Judge's name (which we later link with biographical information).
Litigants: in addition to information about type (private, business or a government agency) and ethnicity, we use the wording of the decision document and litigants' names to code gender.
Claim subject (e.g. breach of contract, tra¢ c accident etc.).
Timing of decision (trial dates are not reported in the decision documents, but as mentioned above, the decision is made within seven days of the trial).
Monetary compensation requested by the plainti¤ and whether a counter claim was …led.
Claim outcome: whether the claim was accepted (partly or fully), rejected, settled outside the court or withdrawn; the monetary transfers; and the legal expenses awarded (if any).
The main analysis in this paper excludes cases that were settled outside the court (121 cases) or withdrawn (58). 10 We also exclude cases with multiple plainti¤s (defendants) such that one plainti¤ (defendant) is Jewish and another is Arab (107). Finally, we exclude cases where the court is located in the Occupied Territories (1). This leaves us with 1,748 cases. Table 1 shows, for each court, the percentage of cases by the ethnicity of the judge, plainti¤ and defendant. Most of the cases are in the two northernmost districts (Northern and Haifa). This is largely due to the combination of two factors. First, the Israeli Arab population is concentrated in the north of the country. Second, online coverage of cases began earlier in the north than in other parts of the country. Overall, 31% of the cases in our data were ruled by Arab judges. Arabs make up 44% of the plainti¤s and 56% of the defendants. In several courts there are no Arab judges while in others most of the cases are ruled by Arab judges. coders in any of the …elds (this happened in 14% of the cases).
9 A comprehensive analysis of the universe of cases would have been prohibitively costly and would not drastically alter our ability to address the questions at hand. 10 In section 4 we examine the possibility that litigants strategically decide to settle cases outside the court or withdraw them. It might be interesting to note that the share of cases settled outside of court (6%) seems rather low. If this is indeed the case, it could suggest a di¢ culty in reaching settlement when the litigants are from di¤erent ethnic groups (we thank Andrew Daughety, Jennifer Reinganum and Kathryn Spier for making this point).
[ Table 1 ]
We use …ve di¤erent measures of the trial outcome. The main measure is a binary variable which takes the value of one if the claim was accepted and zero otherwise. A second outcome variable attempts to distinguish between claims that were partly or fully accepted. This distinction is not straightforward: while in all cases we have information on the monetary compensation awarded by the judge, in more than 60% of the cases we do not know the sum requested. Nonetheless, we can sometimes deduce from the wording of the decision that the claim was "fully accepted."This yields an ordered categorical variable that takes three values: rejected (coded 0), partly accepted (1), or fully accepted (2).
A third measure of trial outcome is the monetary compensation awarded by the judge to the plainti¤ net of the compensation awarded to the defendant (in case there was a counter claim). A fourth measure is the legal expenses awarded to the plainti¤ net of the expenses awarded to the defendant. Finally, we look at the ratio between the net monetary compensation awarded by the judge to the plainti¤ (inclusive of legal expenses) and the sum requested by the plainti¤.
Additional information on judges is obtained from their biographies. Most biographies are available online. The rest were obtained from the court system using freedom of information procedures. Overall, we have 132 judges, …fteen of whom are Arab. Table 2 provides summary statistics. In terms of outcomes, 73% of the claims were accepted (53% partly). Mean net monetary compensation is NIS 3,079 (roughly $700) and mean net legal expenses is NIS 189. On average, plainti¤s receive 80% of the amount they request. As noted above, 31% of the cases were ruled by Arab judges. Cases are evenly split between male and female judges, with the typical judge around …fty years old and with …ve years of tenure. There is little variation in terms of judge education, with relatively few judges holding a degree higher than LLB.
[ Table 2] Turning to case characteristics, we see that tra¢ c accidents account for almost seventy percent of the claims in our data, while thirteen percent have to do with a breach of contract. 11 In about …fteen percent of the cases the subject of the claim cannot be deduced from the decision document. Some documents note that the ruling was given under a condition of "no defense." This means either that no defense statement was submitted or that the defendant(s) failed to appear in the trial (it is not possible to distinguish between these two possibilities). This happened in thirteen percent of the cases (with the others coded "defense present"). A counter claim was …led by the defense in nine percent of the cases. There is usually only one plainti¤ in a case, but often more than one defendant. Almost all cases were …led by private plainti¤s while the share of private litigants out of the total number of defendants is 74% on average. The vast majority of litigants are male. Finally, for the 660 cases for which we have information on the compensation requested by the plainti¤, the average amount is NIS 6,424 ($1,460). In terms of timing, there are relatively few cases in 2000-01, as online coverage of decision documents was still limited. Cases are uniformly distributed over the year, with very few cases decided on a weekend.
Judicial ingroup bias
In this section we estimate the extent of judicial bias for the entire period under study . Based on the court procedures described in section 2.2, our identi…cation strategy assumes that within each court judge assignment is orthogonal to case characteristics. We start by assessing the validity of this assumption. Table 3 examines di¤erences in observed characteristics of cases assigned to Arab and Jewish judges. The …rst two columns show mean characteristics for each set of cases, while the third column presents the di¤erence between the two means. The fourth column reports this di¤erence controlling for court …xed e¤ects. Comparing raw overall means, we …nd some statistically signi…cant di¤erences (column 3). For example, cases assigned to Arab judges are 11 percentage points more likely to have an Arab plainti¤.
12 Similarly, the share of private defendants and the share of male defendants are lower, while the share of male plainti¤s is higher, in cases assigned to Arab judges. However, consistent with the assignment procedure described above, within courts there is no signi…cant di¤erence across Arab and Jewish judges in any observable case characteristic (column 4). This lends support to our identi…cation strategy: there is little evidence to suggest that cases assigned to Arab judges in a given court are systematically di¤erent from those assigned to Jewish ones.
[ Table 3 ]
The results in Table 3 notwithstanding, a potential concern arises from the fact that since in principle plainti¤s can …nd out the identity of the judge prior to the trial, they may withdraw their claim if they were assigned a judge of the opposite ethnicity. This could a¤ect our estimates of judicial bias. If -as may seem reasonable -weaker claims are more likely to be withdrawn, then claims handled by a judge of a di¤erent ethnicity from that of the plainti¤ would be stronger on average than claims handled by a judge of the same ethnicity as the plainti¤. This would produce a downward bias in the estimated judicial ingroup bias. In Appendix Table A1 we test whether cases are more likely to be withdrawn when assigned to a judge of the opposite ethnicity to that of the plainti¤. We …nd no evidence for such an association. We similarly …nd no evidence that cases are more (or less) likely to be settled outside of court when assigned to a judge of the opposite ethnicity to that of the plainti¤.
A …nal potential concern is that under certain circumstances plainti¤s may have the opportunity to choose in which court to submit their claim (see section 2.2). Since we generally do not know where litigants reside, we cannot tell in which cases plainti¤s had such a choice. To the extent that such opportunities were present, one might worry that plainti¤s would tend to …le their claims in courts where there is a relatively high proportion of judges from their own ethnic group (call this proportion p). This may bias our estimate of judicial ingroup bias if there is an association between p and the strength of the claim. However, it is again reasonable to assume that such an association -if it exists -will produce a downward biased estimate, as plainti¤s are more likely to choose courts strategically when their claims are weaker. 
Results
We start by presenting general patterns of judicial decisions in the raw data. Figure 1 displays the share of claims accepted by judge and plainti¤ ethnicity. The left pair of bars pertains to cases where the plainti¤ is Jewish and the defendant is Arab. Seventy nine percent of these claims are accepted when the judge is Jewish while only 72% are accepted when the judge is Arab. This in itself is not necessarily evidence for ingroup bias: for example, it may be 13 To see this more clearly, consider a plainti¤ with a choice between two courts, one closer to her place of residence than the other (call these courts Home and Away). Suppose that the plainti¤ knows the p in each court and believes that her chances of winning are higher the higher is p. This plainti¤ would incur the cost of submitting her claim in the Away court if and only if this su¢ ciently improves her chances of winning the case. There are two possibilities. If p is at least as high in the Home as in the Away court, she would submit at Home. In contrast, if p is higher in the Away court she may …le there. Now, if the case is "airtight" (i.e. the probability of winning at Home is close to 1) there is little reason to …le in the Away court since this cannot signi…cantly improve the chances of winning. However, if the case is su¢ ciently weak, and the expected gain from …ling at the Away court is independent of the strength of the case, there may be su¢ cient incentive to …le at the Away (high-p) court. (A similar conclusion obtains if the expected gain from …ling at the Away court decreases with the strength of the claim. Results are ambiguous if the gain increases with the strength of the claim). This would mean that claims …led in courts with a high proportion of judges from the same ethnic group as the plainti¤ would be weaker on average. the case that compared to their Arab colleagues, Jewish judges are somewhat more inclined towards plainti¤s. However, if this was the only reason for the di¤erence, we would expect to observe a similar pattern regardless of plainti¤ ethnicity. In fact, the right pair of bars shows that when the plainti¤ is Arab, the pattern is reversed: Jewish judges accept 65% of these claims while Arab judges accept 75%.
[ Figure 1 ] Table 4 presents a di¤erences-in-di¤erences analysis of the raw data. As the top row shows, Arab judges are 3.7 percentage points more likely to accept a claim when the plainti¤ is Arab rather than Jewish. Again, in itself this is no evidence for ingroup bias: Arab plainti¤s might on average …le stronger claims than Jewish plainti¤s. However, Jewish judges (second row) are 14.4 percentage points less likely to accept a claim when the plainti¤ is Arab rather than Jewish. The di¤erence in these di¤erences -18% -provides an indication of the extent of ingroup bias (i.e. by how much are Arab judges more likely than their Jewish colleagues to accept a claim …led by an Arab plainti¤ rather than by a Jewish one). It should be emphasized that, absent an ethnicity-free benchmark, it is impossible to speculate on whether and to what extent Jewish judges favor Jewish litigants and Arab judges favor Arab litigants. We revisit this issue in section 5.2 below.
[ Table 4 ]
We now turn to an econometric investigation. Our baseline speci…cation is of the form:
where y ijct is the outcome of case i; assigned to judge j; in court c; at time t; c is a court …xed e¤ect; and ijct is an error term clustered within judge. 14 ArabPlainti¤, ArabJudge and the interaction term ArabPlainti¤ ArabJudge are indicator variables. Equation (1) allows for two possible di¤erences across ethnic groups which, as mentioned above, do not necessarily indicate ingroup bias. First, it is possible that claims submitted by Arab plainti¤s have di¤erent unobserved characteristics than those submitted by Jewish plainti¤s. Thus, 1 may be nonzero even in the absence of ingroup bias. Second, it is possible 14 Notice that while the judge is the relevant treatment and we allow for clustering at this level, the clustering problem is not very central in our setting since the main explanatory variable -ArabPlainti¤ ArabJudge -varies within the treatment group. Nonetheless, we allow for clustering at the judge level to address possible within-judge correlations (which might exist even with the judge …xed e¤ects in equation (2) below). This yields slightly higher standard errors than either uncorrected or heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
that Arab judges are di¤erently inclined towards plainti¤s than their Jewish colleagues. In other words, 2 may be nonzero even in the absence of ingroup bias. Our interest is in 3 , which captures ingroup bias.
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Column 1 in Table 5 presents the results using the binary outcome measure, i.e. whether the claim was accepted or rejected. The estimates suggest that Arab plainti¤s are …fteen percentage points less likely than Jewish plainti¤s to win a case and that Arab judges are eight percentage points less likely than Jewish judges to accept claims. The main result is in the third row, which shows a positive and highly statistically signi…cant degree of ingroup bias. A claim is seventeen percentage points more likely to be accepted if assigned to a judge of the same ethnicity as the plainti¤.
[ Table 5 ]
We next augment the baseline speci…cation with additional controls. Speci…cally, we estimate:
where j is a judge …xed e¤ect and tenure jt is judge's tenure at the job. 16 The vector X i is a list of case-speci…c controls that includes: the number of plainti¤s; the number of defendants; the share of private plainti¤s; the share of private defendants; the share of male plainti¤s; the share of male defendants; the amount of compensation requested (and an indicator for missing values); indicators for claim subjects; an indicator for "defense present"; and an indicator for cases where the defendant …led a counter-claim. t is a vector of year, month and day of week dummies.
In columns 2-4 of Table 5 we progressively add these sets of controls. This signi…cantly increases the explanatory power of the regression. The degree of ingroup bias is, however, robust to the inclusion of the additional variables and has a point estimate of 19.2% in the full speci…cation. This is a slightly stronger e¤ect than that of …ling a counter claim (included in the unreported case controls and estimated at 0:154 with a 0:046 standard error).
To check the extent to which these results are driven by the decisions of a single judge, we repeatedly estimate the full regression (column 4 of Table 5 ), each time removing from the sample cases ruled by a di¤erent judge. The point estimate of 3 in these 132 regressions ranges from 0.158 to 0.207 (and is always highly statistically signi…cant).
We next estimate the extent of ingroup bias using equation (2) with the four alternative outcome measures described above. The results are reported in Table 6 . In the …rst two columns the dependant variable takes three values according to whether the claim was rejected (0), partly accepted (1), or fully accepted (2). The qualitative results, using either OLS or Ordered Probit, are the same as those obtained in Table 5 using the binary outcome measure.
[ Table 6 ]
In column 3 the dependent variable is the net monetary compensation awarded by the judge to the plainti¤ (compensation awarded to plainti¤ minus compensation awarded to defendant). The results indicate that a plainti¤ facing a judge of the same ethnicity receives on average NIS 926 (roughly $210) more than a similar plainti¤ facing a judge of the opposite ethnicity. To put this …gure in perspective, recall that the maximum compensation that can be requested in these courts is NIS 17,800 while -in the 660 cases where we have this information -the average compensation requested by the plainti¤s is NIS 6,424.
We next examine the net legal expenses awarded by the judge to the plainti¤ (expenses awarded to plainti¤ minus expenses awarded to defendant). Legal expenses were awarded in 76% of the cases. The decision on legal expenses is plausibly even more discretionary than the decision to accept or reject the claim and the decision on the amount of compensation to award. The decision to accept a claim is in principle grounded in the judge's reading of the facts of the matter while the compensation awarded is based on the documents (e.g. a car damage assessment) submitted to the court. In contrast, it is hard to establish the appropriate legal expenses, e.g. the amount and value of time expended on the legal procedure (recall no lawyers are allowed in small claims courts). The results (column 4) indicate an ingroup bias of NIS 224 ($50) in legal expenses. This is roughly 0.45 of the standard deviation of net legal expenses (see Table 2 ) whereas the bias in net monetary compensation reported in column 3 is 0.24 of the standard deviation of this variable.
Finally, in column 5 the dependent variable is the monetary yield of the claim, de…ned as the ratio between the net monetary compensation (including legal expenses) awarded to the plainti¤ and the compensation requested by the plainti¤. As mentioned above, the denominator in this ratio is only available for 660 cases. Consequently, the bias is not estimated very precisely. Nonetheless, the point estimate suggests that a plainti¤ receives on average 10% more of the amount requested when facing a judge of the same ethnicity.
The shadow of terrorism
The previous section establishes the existence of judicial ingroup bias in Israeli small claims courts during 2000-04. An interesting and important question is whether and to what extent this bias is a¤ected by the social environment. In particular, the period under study is characterized by intense levels of ethnically-based violence, which may well lead to stronger ethnic identi…cation. In this section we examine whether variations in terrorism intensity across space and time -which are plausibly exogenous to the legal procedure -a¤ect the extent of judicial ingroup bias. Such an e¤ect would be consistent with the extensive literature on the e¤ects of group salience on ingroup bias.
Data
We use data on all Palestinian politically motivated fatal attacks inside Israel (i.e. excluding the Occupied Territories). For each attack we have information about date, location, and number of civilian and security forces fatalities. 17 We merge these data with the judicial decision data used above. Table 7 reports the number of fatalities from terrorist attacks by district and year. Panel A reports civilian fatalities only, while panel B reports total fatalities (civilian and security forces). These …gures are normalized by the population in each district and year. The table reveals substantial variation across districts with the most severely hit districts being Jerusalem and Haifa. The intensity of violence increased until 2002 and subsided in the following years. Overall there were 615 fatalities, 514 of them civilian.
[ Table 7] 17 The dataset combines information from several sources: B'Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories; The Israeli Ministry of Foreign A¤airs; the Israeli National Insurance Institute; and the Israeli Ministry of Defense. See Romanov et al. (forthcoming) for details. Our identi…cation strategy relies on variation in the intensity of ethnic violence in the vicinity of the courts. Hence we cannot use data on (predominantly Palestinian) fatalities in the Occupied Territories. As mentioned above, there was only one case in this period handled in a court located in the Occupied Territories which involved litigants of opposite ethnicities. This case is dropped from our analyses.
In the analysis below, our measure of terrorism intensity is the (population adjusted) number of fatalities from attacks that occurred in a given geographical area around the court during the year preceding the judicial decision. We examine three alternative geographical areas around the court. Natural area is the smallest geographic unit examined, followed by sub-district and district. Our data span 24 natural areas, 15 sub-districts, and 6 districts. Descriptive statistics on fatalities are in the last panel of Table 2 .
The use of within-country temporal and spatial variation in terrorism fatalities to identify the e¤ects of terrorism follows a long list of previous studies. A key advantage of this strategy is that it controls for any developments at the national level which are correlated with the country-wide intensity of terrorism and may a¤ect the outcome of interest (see Gould and Klor, forthcoming, for a recent discussion). In our setting, one might imagine that terrorist attacks lead to (or follow) various actions and statements by government o¢ cials which could a¤ect judicial decision making country-wide.
Before turning to the results, Table 8 examines whether cases assigned to Arab judges become di¤erent from cases assigned to Jewish judges as the number of fatalities in the vicinity of the court increases. For ease of interpretation, the …rst column shows the overall mean and standard deviation of each of the case characteristics. In columns 2-7 we regress each case characteristic on: (1) an indicator for Arab judge; (2) the per-capita number of fatalities in the vicinity of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision; (3) an interaction between the Arab judge indicator and the number of fatalities; and (4) court …xed e¤ects. The table reports the coe¢ cient on the interaction term (3), which represents the di¤erential e¤ect of terrorism intensity on the characteristics of cases assigned to an Arab versus a Jewish judge. As the table plainly shows, there is little evidence of such di¤erential e¤ects.
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Results
Figure 2 compares case outcomes (share of claims accepted) when there are no civilian fatalities in the close vicinity (natural area) of the court to outcomes obtained when the number of civilian fatalities is positive. As in Figure 1 , both panels indicate the existence of ingroup bias. However, the extent of the bias is signi…cantly smaller in the "No-fatalities" cases, which make up 41% of the total (left panel). A simple di¤erence-in-di¤erence calculation suggests an ingroup bias of only 6% in these cases.
19 By contrast, the bias in the "Positive number of fatalities"cases is 25%.
20
[ Figure 2 ]
Another way to examine the e¤ect of fatalities is to augment equation (2) with measures of terrorism intensity interacted with the ethnicity variables. Speci…cally, we estimate an equation of the form:
where Fatalities ct is the number of fatalities (per 10,000 population) in the vicinity of court c in the year preceding the judicial decision. Our main interest is in 3 : the e¤ect of terrorism intensity on judicial ingroup bias. Table 9 reports the results. The …rst column replicates the results from the full regression without controlling for terrorism (column 4 of Table 5 ). Columns 2-7 report results of the augmented regressions for the di¤erent measures of Fatalities ct . We …nd strong evidence that terrorism intensity is associated with higher levels of judicial ethnic ingroup bias. The estimated 3 in columns 2-4 imply that an additional civilian fatality per 100,000 population in the vicinity of the court is associated with a 2.6-3.9 percentage points larger bias. A similar but somewhat weaker e¤ect is observed when examining total rather than only civilian fatalities (columns 5-7).
[ Table 9 ]
Note also that the estimated 3 in the second row captures the expected judicial ingroup bias when the number of fatalities is zero (under the econometric speci…cation in equation (3) which assumes linearity of the bias in the number of fatalities). A comparison of the 3 estimates in columns 2-7 with that reported in column 1 again indicates that in the absence of terrorism the extent of judicial bias is substantially lower. 21 Finally, the variation in terrorism intensity allows us to address an issue that could not be resolved when estimating the overall judicial bias in section 4. As noted there, in the absence of an ethnicity-free benchmark, one cannot establish whether and to what extent Jewish judges favor Jewish litigants and Arab judges favor Arab litigants. As argued above, however, terrorism intensity is not related to di¤erences in case characteristics across Arab and Jewish judges. Thus, if terrorism increases the salience of ethnicity and thereby strengthens ethnic identi…cation, we can use variations in terrorism intensity to estimate the marginal e¤ect of ethnic identi…cation on judicial bias. 22 Crucially, we can do this separately for Arab and Jewish judges. In Table 10 we hence estimate an equation of the following form, separately for judges of each ethnicity:
where all the variables are de…ned as before. Our interest is in 1 : the e¤ect of terrorism intensity on the di¤erential treatment of Arab versus Jewish plainti¤s.
[ Table 10 ]
Columns 1 and 5 show benchmark results (without controlling for the e¤ect of terrorism). Jewish judges are 11 percentage points less likely, and Arab judges are 7 percentage points more likely, to accept a claim …led by an Arab rather than by a Jewish plainti¤. As emphasized above, we cannot tell whether these estimated e¤ects represent bias on the part of Jewish judges, Arab judges or both. Columns 2-4 examine the e¤ect of terrorism on Jewish judges. While the coe¢ cients are imprecisely estimated, they suggest that terrorism makes Jewish judges less likely to accept claims …led by Arab plainti¤s. Similarly, columns 6-8 indicate that terrorism makes Arab judges more likely to accept claims …led by Arab plainti¤s. These results seem to indicate that judicial ingroup bias exists on both sides.
Conclusion
The voluminous literature on ingroup bias and its determinants has largely relied on lab experiments and (to a lesser extent) on structured …eld experiments. Two of the major Estimating equation (3) using binary versions of the fatality variables used in Table 9 yields estimates of 3 which are for the most part smaller than 0.1 and statistically indistinguishable from zero (the only exception is when using civilian fatalities at the district level, in which case the estimated 3 is 0.18 with p-value=0.09).
22 This approach is similar to that taken by Benjamin et al. (forthcoming) who identify the marginal behavioral e¤ects of social identities by manipulating the salience of ethnic identities of laboratory subjects. results in this literature relate to (1) the e¤ect of group membership on individual behavior toward ingroup and outgroup members, and in particular the display of ingroup bias; and (2) the sensitivity of this e¤ect to the salience of group membership. While these results are quite robust, concerns regarding external validity of experimental studies, especially if conducted in the lab, are widespread (e.g. Levitt and List 2007) . This paper contributes to our understanding of ingroup bias by examining behavior in naturally occurring data. Using a unique dataset of judicial decisions in Israeli courts, we …nd support for both of the above experimental results.
Our identi…cation strategy, which relies on plausibly exogenous variation both in the assignment of judges and in the salience of ethnicity, allows us to overcome a major challenge facing the literature on ethnic and racial bias in judicial decisions, namely the potential correlation between ethnicity and unobserved case characteristics.
The overall level of judicial ingroup bias we uncover in the period studied is arguably quite substantial. A claim is 17% to 20% more likely to be accepted if assigned to a judge of the same ethnicity as the plainti¤. While this poses a challenge to the Israeli judicial system, perhaps more important is the fact that the bias is hardly an exogenously given fact. In areas which experienced relatively little ethnic strife the bias is substantially lower. This may suggest the feasibility of debiasing e¤orts.
From the perspective of the literature on ethnic con ‡icts, our results shed light on the poorly understood e¤ect of such con ‡icts on institutions and social norms (see Blattman and Miguel 2010 for a discussion). Speci…cally, it highlights a possibly important e¤ect of ethnic con ‡icts, often overlooked in the con ‡ict literature. Indeed, as we have seen, even if the con ‡ict does not directly involve the domestic ethnic groups, by intensifying ethnic identities it can produce distortions in judicial decisions, thus potentially eroding property rights and public trust in the rule of law. 
APPENDIX

A Theoretical framework
This appendix outlines a general model of social identity and relates it to judicial decisions in an ethnically heterogeneous society. The model attempts to capture empirical regularities documented in three well-established strands of research that study behavior in groups: the minimal group paradigm; public goods experiments; and the study of conformity.
23 A more thorough discussion of the model and the underlying evidence can be found in Shayo (2009).
Consider an economy with a set N of individuals and a given set G of social groups: G = fJjJ N is a social groupg: For the present purposes it su¢ ces to say that a social group is not any arbitrary subset of the population but an existing category that individuals learn to recognize when living in a society. Denote by G i the set of social groups to which individual i belongs: G i = fJ : J 2 G and i 2 Jg: We will say that an individual i identi…es with group J if she prefers outcomes where (1) group J's status is high and (2) her perceived distance from typical members of group J is low (we make the terms status and distance precise in equations 5 and 6 below). Speci…cally, let T be the set of outcomes of individuals' actions and let i (t) be i's material payo¤ from outcome t 2 T (e.g. i's monetary transfer resulting from litigation). Let S J (t) be group J's status and d iJ (t) be i's perceived distance from group J:
De…nition 1 Individual i is said to identify with group J if her preferences over outcomes can be ordered by a utility function of the form:
such that u is increasing in S J (t) and decreasing in d iJ (t).
Given this de…nition, identi…cation is inferred from individual behavior by revealed preference.
Of course, people do not necessarily care about (or seek to resemble) members of any group they belong to. The following equilibrium concept attempts to capture the endogenous determination of the groups people identify with. For simplicity we assume that each 23 Standard two-person economic experiments (e.g. dictator, ultimatum and prisoner's dilemma games) have mostly abstracted from group-related issues. Recently, however, a number of studies began incorporating groups into the design of these games. individual identi…es with a single group. Denote by A i the set of actions available to individual i and suppose the outcome of individual actions is given by some function f : A ! T (where A = i2N A i is the set of possible action pro…les).
De…nition 2 A Social Identity Equilibrium (SIE) is a pro…le of actions a = (a i ) i2N and a pro…le of social identities g = (g i ) i2N such that for all i 2 N we have a i 2 A i ; g i 2 G i and
Thus, SIE requires not only that actions be optimal given what others are doing, but also that each individual's social identity be optimal given her social environment. Speci…cally, an individual is more likely to identify with a group the higher is its social status and the smaller is the perceived distance between herself and that group.
So far, we have been rather vague about the meaning of perceived distance and status. We now o¤er speci…c ways to operationalize these concepts and provide some brief motivation for their role in De…nition 2.
Perceived distance. People are less likely to categorize themselves into a given group the higher the di¤erence they perceive between themselves and that group (Turner et al. 1987) . A convenient way to model perceived di¤erence is to use the notion of "distance in conceptual space" (e.g. Nosofsky 1986 , Gärdenfors 2000 . Each individual is characterized by a vector of attributes (or qualities) q i = (q 1 i ; q 2 i ; :::; q H i ). A social group is characterized by the "typical" attributes of its members, denoted q J . For simplicity assume q J is the mean across group members, i.e. q J = 1 jJj P i2J q i . q J is called the prototype of group J: The perceived distance between individual i and social group J is represented by a weighted Euclidean distance function:
where 0 w h 1 and P w h = 1. The w's are attention weights (Nosofsky 1986): the more salient is attribute h relative to other attributes, the more attention is devoted to it, which is captured by a higher w h . This speci…cation allows the social environment to a¤ect perceived distances in two distinct ways. First, distances may change as the attributes of the agents (namely the values of q i and q J ) change. For example, the higher the fraction of people in a group that speak my language, the more similar I perceive myself to that group. Second -and this is the e¤ect studied in this paper -perceived distances can change as the attention paid to the various dimensions changes, e.g. as ethnicity becomes more salient relative to other attributes.
As a speci…c example, consider a binary attribute -call it attribute e -shared by all members of group J and only by them. For concreteness think of e as a speci…c ethnicity and of J as the ethnic group. That is q e i = 1 if i 2 J and q e i = 0 otherwise. This means that q e i q e J = 0 for all members of J. Suppose that there are also other attributes (e.g. rich/poor) which characterize some but not all members of J, such that q h i 6 = q h J for i 2 J and some attribute h: From equation (5) we know that in this case d iJ > 0 for i 2 J: Now, consider an exogenous increase in the salience of attribute e; reducing the salience of all other attributes (w e increases while w h decreases for all h 6 = e). This means an increase in the attention paid to an attribute shared by all group members and a decrease in the attention paid to other attributes, which implies that d iJ decreases.
Group status. Studies in social psychology argue that the evaluation of a group is often performed by social comparisons to other groups along valued dimensions of comparisons (Tajfel and Turner 1986). In our setting, one such dimension is material payo¤s. Thus, we can think of group status in terms similar to standard treatments of individual status in economics. That is, we can represent the status of group J as a function
where J is the mean material payo¤ of individuals that belong to group J and J is the reference-group of group J (which in a two-group setting is simply the other group). We assume that the status of group J is strictly increasing in J and is weakly decreasing in J . 24 Given equation (6), identi…cation with a group implies caring about the material payo¤s of other group members.
Application to Judicial decisions
The above model is grounded primarily in results from lab experiments that document behavior in groups. This paper attempts to shed light on two major implications of the model in naturally occurring data. First, that members of a social group may behave in a way that takes into account the payo¤s of other members of their group. Second, that such behavior is more likely to be observed when group-speci…c attributes become salient.
Consider a judge who is also a member of some ethnic group. The judge is faced with a plainti¤ and a defendant, and needs to decide the outcome of the trial, namely the monetary transfer t from defendant to plainti¤ (which could be negative). The material payo¤s of the 24 If the status function is constant in J , group J's status depends on the group's mean absolute, rather than relative, payo¤. As our data consist of decisions that transfer money from an ingroup member to an outgroup member, we cannot distinguish in this paper between actions that enhance relative and absolute group payo¤s. litigants are then simply:
The judge's own material payo¤ is not directly a¤ected by her ruling, but one might suspect that wrong decisions can entail loss of utility for various reasons (e.g. the existence of strong non-discriminatory norms or reduced prospects of promotion). Denoting by b t the "correct" decision, we write
Let E; E 0 2 G be two ethnic groups that partition N . Let q e i = 1 if i 2 E and q e i = 0 otherwise, and denote by w e the associated attention weight. As in the example above, assume that the groups are not homogeneous, i.e. there are attributes which characterize some but not all members of each group. Finally, assume that attributes and attention weights are not a¤ected by the judicial decision. Denoting by t the transfer determined by the judge, we make two observations. Observation 1 Suppose plainti¤ 2 E and defendant 2 E 0 : Then t > b t if the judge identi…es with group E; and t < b t if the judge identi…es with group E 0 :
Observation 2 The higher is the relative salience of ethnicity ( w e ), the more likely it is that in equilibrium the judge identi…es with her ethnic group.
Using Observation 1, Section 4 in the paper examines the extent of ethnic identi…cation among judges. Section 5 examines Observation 2.
B Coding litigant ethnicity
This appendix describes the procedure we use to code litigant ethnicity. The legal documents do not consistently order …rst and last names. We therefore decompose each litigant name into its components (separated by spaces) such as "Abraham"+"Benjamin"+"Cohen". There may be up to four such components. We do not impose any assumption regarding the gender of the litigant, nor whether a particular component represents a …rst, middle or last name. Using an external database derived from the Israel Population Registry, we compute for each component the following conditional probabilities of it being an Arab name: A name component is designated "Arab"if maxfp f m ; p f f ; p lm ; p lf g > 0:95 and minfp f m ; p f f ; p lm ; p lf g > 0:05: That is, we designate a component as Arab if at least one of the conditional probabilities is very high (i.e., the name component is highly likely to belong to an Arab individual) and none of the conditional probabilities is very low (that is, none of the conditional probabilities suggests that the name component is highly likely to belong to a Jewish individual). Similarly, a component is designated "Jewish" if minfp f m ; p f f ; p lm ; p lf g 0:05 and maxfp f m ; p f f ; p lm ; p lf g 0:95:
A litigant is coded as Arab if at least one of his or her name components is designated as "Arab"and none of the other components is designated as "Jewish". Similarly, a litigant is coded as Jewish if at least one of his or her name components is designated as "Jewish"and none of the other components is designated as "Arab". This procedure assigns an ethnicity to the vast majority of private litigants (50,294 out of 53,029). The fact that the share of names that are not assigned an ethnicity is very small is consistent with the fact that in Israel there is little overlap in naming conventions across ethnicities and there are virtually no marriages across ethnic lines. 26 To assign ethnicity to the remaining litigants we search for their names in an electronic directory service. This allows us to locate the exact addresses of people bearing these names. Relying on the fact that in Israel Arabs and Jews tend to live in di¤erent communities (either di¤erent towns and villages, or di¤erent neighborhoods within integrated towns), we are able to assign ethnicities to almost all litigants. The few remaining cases are not coded. Table 5 (see text for details), replacing the outcome variable with an indicator for whether the claim was withdrawn (columns 1-2), settled outside the court (columns 3-4), or either (columns 5-6). The sample is larger as it includes cases withdrawn and settled outside court. Regressions were estimated by OLS. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are reported in parentheses. * , ** , *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Notes: In columns 1-2 the dependent variable takes the value of 0 if the claim was rejected, 1 if the claim was partly accepted, and 2 if the claim was fully accepted. In column 3 the dependent variable is the net monetary compensation awarded by the judge to the plaintiff (compensation awarded to plaintiff minus compensation awarded to defendant). In column 4 the dependent variable is the net legal expenses awarded by the judge to the plaintiff (expenses awarded to plaintiff minus expenses awarded to defendant). In column 5 the dependent variable is the ratio between the net monetary compensation (including legal expenses) awarded by the judge to the plaintiff and the compensation requested by the plaintiff. In columns 1-4 missing values for monetary compensation requested by the plaintiff are dummied out. In column 5 the monetary compensation requested by the plaintiff is not included in the case characteristics. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are reported in parentheses. * , ** , *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses in column 1. Standard errors in brackets in columns 2-7. Each entry in columns 2-7 is derived from a separate OLS regression where the explanatory variables are: (1) an indicator for Arab judge; (2) the number of civilian/total (civilian and security forces) fatalities from terrorist attacks in the natural area/sub-district/district of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision per 10,000 population; (3) an interaction between the Arab judge indicator and the number of fatalities; and (4) court fixed effects. The Table reports the coefficient on the interaction term (3). * , ** , *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Notes: "Fatalities" is the number of civilian/total (civilian and security forces) fatalities from terrorist attacks in the natural area/sub-district/district of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision per 10,000 population. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Missing values for monetary compensation requested by plaintiff are dummied out. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are reported in parentheses.
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* , ** , *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Notes: "Fatalities" is the number of civilian/total (civilian and security forces) fatalities from terrorist attacks in the natural area/subdistrict/district of the court in the year preceding the judicial decision per 10,000 population. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Missing values for monetary compensation requested by plaintiff are dummied out. Standard errors, clustered by judge, are reported in parentheses. * , ** , *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
